| Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments | |
| Li, Xuelong1; Jusup, Marko2; Wang, Zhen3; Li, Huijia4; Shi, Lei5; Podobnik, Boris6,7,8,9,10; Stanley, H. Eugene6; Havlin, Shlomo11,12; Boccaletti, Stefano13,14 | |
| 作者部门 | 光学影像学习与分析中心 |
| 2018-01-02 | |
| 发表期刊 | PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 |
| ISSN | 0027-8424 |
| 卷号 | 115期号:1页码:30-35 |
| 产权排序 | 1 |
| 摘要 | Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism-costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks. |
| 关键词 | Cooperation Defection Node Strategy Payoff Evolutionary Selection |
| DOI | 10.1073/pnas.1707505115 |
| 收录类别 | SCI ; SSCI |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000419128700022 |
| 引用统计 | |
| 文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 条目标识符 | http://ir.opt.ac.cn/handle/181661/30814 |
| 专题 | 光谱成像技术研究室 |
| 作者单位 | 1.Chinese Acad Sci, Xian Inst Opt & Precis Mech, Xian 710119, Shaanxi, Peoples R China; 2.Hokkaido Univ, Res Inst Elect Sci, Ctr Math Social Creat, Sapporo, Hokkaido 0600812, Japan; 3.Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Ctr Opt Imagery Anal & Learning, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China; 4.Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Beijing 100080, Peoples R China; 5.Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Stat & Math Coll, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China; 6.Boston Univ, Dept Phys, Ctr Polymer Studies, 590 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA 02215 USA; 7.Univ Rijeka, Fac Civil Engn, Rijeka 51000, Croatia; 8.Zagreb Sch Econ & Management, Zagreb 10000, Croatia; 9.Luxembourg Sch Business, L-2453 Luxembourg, Luxembourg; 10.Fac Informat Studies, SI-8000 Novo Mesto, Slovenia; 11.Bar Ilan Univ, Dept Phys, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel; 12.Tokyo Inst Technol, Tokyo 1528552, Japan; 13.CNR, Institute Complex Syst, I-50019 Florence, Italy; 14.Italian Embassy Israel, IL-68125 Tel Aviv, Israel |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li, Xuelong,Jusup, Marko,Wang, Zhen,et al. Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,2018,115(1):30-35. |
| APA | Li, Xuelong.,Jusup, Marko.,Wang, Zhen.,Li, Huijia.,Shi, Lei.,...&Boccaletti, Stefano.(2018).Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments.PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,115(1),30-35. |
| MLA | Li, Xuelong,et al."Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments".PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 115.1(2018):30-35. |
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| Punishment diminishe（2026KB） | 期刊论文 | 出版稿 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 请求全文 | |
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